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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
LA~IO:\"T F. TOHONTO, 
Pia in tiff-Respond rnt, 
- vs.-
(H~ORGE D. CLYDE, A. PRATT KES-
L~~R, CLAIR R. HOPKINS and THE 
~TATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 
10069 
BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT 
~TATEJ\lENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for a declaratory judgment to de-
tennine the constitutionality of certain portions of Chap-
ter 148, Laws of Utah 1963, codified as Chapter 2 of 
Title 63, lTtah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, com-
monly known as Senate Bill 48 of the 35th Legislature. 
The action was also brought for a determination that 
the payment to the defendant Clair R. Hopkins, Direc-
tor of Finance of the State of Utah, of his salary for 
the period July 1 through July 15, 1963 was unlawful. 
The portions of the act sought to be declared unconstitu-
tional relate to the payment of expenditures of state 
funds without the approval prior to payn1ent of the 
Board of Examiners of the State of l~tah. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
'The judgment and decree of the lower court (R. 35-
38) determined: 
1. The Board of Examiners has the duty to examine 
all claims against the state with the sole exception of 
salaries or compensation fixed by law but including 
claims for which an appropriation has been made as 
well as claims for which no appropriation has been 
made. The payment of any such claim against the State 
of Utah prior to the examination and approval of the 
same by the Board of Examiners is unlawful except 
where such claim has previously been denied by the 
Board of Examiners and appealed to and approved by 
the Legislature. 
2. Insofar as Senate Bill 48 of the 35th Legislature 
authorized the Director of Finance to process and pay 
claims against the state (other than salaries or compen-
sation fixed by law) without the exmnination and ap-
proval of the Board of Exa1niners of the State of Utah 
prior to the payment thereof, such authority is void, 
unconstitutional and unlawful and in particular the fol-
lowing portions of Section 63-2-13, 63-2-15 and 63-2-20, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 are unconstitutional: 
"63-2-13. The director of finance shall pre-
scribe and fix a schedule of salaries for the offi-
cers, clerks, stenographers and employees of all 
state offices, departments, boards and commis-
sions, except where such salaries are fixed by 
statute, by appropriation or where agency gov-
erning boards are authorized by statute to fix 
the salary of certain officers. . . . The board of 
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o) 
•·xaminen; in eon dud i ng any .-xmnination of 
<'laims shall not han· authority to fix, re~<'t or 
arhi t rari ly n·fusl' to pay ~alaries ~l't hy the direc-
tor of finaneP or officer's salaries as detennined 
by ag-•·n<·~· governing boards. Such schedule of 
~alari('~ :-;hall have the force of law in all state 
offices, departments, boards and commissions, 
and shall in no <·asc~ be exceeded without the ex-
LH'PSS approval of the director of finance. .K o 
salary schedule shall be put into effect until ap-
proved h~· the governor. 
"G:J-~-15. The director of finance shall estab-
lish 1nileage and travel expense schedules and 
set up rules and regulations for travel of all 
state officers, employees and part-time officials; 
and such schedules shall have the force of law 
in all deparbnents and no voucher for travel ex-
pense shall be paid until the smne has been ap-
proved b~T the director. No obligation shall be 
incurred for travel outside of the state without 
the advance approval of the governor through 
the director of finance. Such approval shall con-
sist of a certification as to the availability of 
funds as well as a review of the necessity and 
desirability of such travel. This provision shall 
not apply to the legislature, legislative commit-
tees or me1nbers and employees of the legislative 
council. 
"63-2-20 .... The director shall examine and 
approve or disapprove all requisitions and re-
q nests for proposed expenditures of the several 
deparbnents, except salaries or compensation of 
officers fixed by law in which case the director 
shall certify only the availability of funds, and 
no requisitions of any of the departments shall 
be allowed nor shall any obligation be created 
without the approval and the certification of the 
director. ... It is the intent of the legislature 
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4 
that the department of finance shall exa1nine and 
pass upon all proposed expenditures. Any exam-
ination of" claims as may be conducted by the 
board of examiners shall be made prior to pay-
ment but only after the obligation has been in-
curred and an account has been submitted and 
audited by the state's accounting officer." 
3. The Board of Examiners may not delegate its 
ultimate duty to determine the validity of claims against 
the State of Utah but may make reasonable rules con-
cerning its methods of examining claims and should 
hold regular meetings of such Board for the proper 
execution of its constitutional duties. 
4. The payment of the salary claim of Clair R. 
Hopkins for the pay period July 1 through July 15, 1963 
was unlawful, invalid and void and constituted an il-
legal expenditure of public funds since this claim was 
paid without the prior approval of the Board of Exam-
Iners. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and Respondent seeks affirmance of the 
judgment and decree of the court below. 
STA:TEMENT OF FACT8 
·The statement of facts set forth in the brief of 
appellants is accurate and correctly quotes the stipula-
tion of facts entered into by the parties which are a 
part of the record on appeal. The court's attention is 
called to Exhibits "A," "B," "C" and "D," referred to 
in the stipulation and included in the record, but which 
are not quoted at length in Appellants' brief. 
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ABUl.~IENT 
POIXT L 
rrlii•: BOARD OF EXA~IINER~ HA~ THE 
Dl.TY '1_10 EXAl\UKE ALL C LA I ~IS 
AGAI~ST THE STATE EXCEPT SAL-
.\ HIE~ OR (•<>~IPEXSATION OF OFFICERS 
FIXED BY LA \\T. 
It i~ well settled by a long linP of decisions of this 
t•onrt that the Board of Exan1iners of the State of lTtah 
has the quasi-judicial authority granted by the Utah 
Constitution (Article YII, Section 13) to exmnine and 
approve or disapprove all clai1ns against the state t•xeept 
~alarie:::; or cmnpensation fixed by law. This authority 
applies not only to claims for which no appropriation 
has bePn 1nade (the typical tort claim or contract claim 
not within the scope of an appropriation, often referred 
to as "unliquidated" clai1ns) but also to claims for which 
an appropriation has been 1nade (ordinary expenditures 
of funds appropriated by the Legislature, sometilnes 
referred to as ''liquidated" claims). U intah State Bank 
r. Aja.r, 77 rtah 455, :297 Pac. -13-! (1931); Bateman r. 
Board of Examiners, 7 F.:2d :2:21, 322 P.2d 381 (1958). 
The constitutional provision itself provides an appeal 
to the Legislature from a denial of the claiin. vVood v. 
Budge. 13 U.2d 359, 37-1 P.2d 516 (196:2). Also, the prior 
decisions of this court have indicated that any arbi-
trary action by the Board of Exmniners would be sub-
ject to court review. Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 
supra; State ex rel. Dat·is v. Cutler, 3-! rtah 99, 95 Pac. 
1071 (1908); Thoreson L State Board of Examiners, 
19 rtah 18, 57 Pac. 1'75 (1899); :21 Utah lSI, 60 Pac. 
98:2 (1900). 
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The term claim within the meaning of the consti-
tutional language is an t'xtremely broad one and com-
prehends all requests for expenditures of public funds. 
This court defined "claim" in Bateman v. Board of 
Examiners, 7 U.2d at 226, as follows: 
"In the first place, we think that the word 
'claim' was used in its broadest connotation and 
we recognize that it is susceptible of a variety of 
meanings : ranging from a moral claim; or the 
seeking of legislative largesse ; or asserting a 
privilege; to asserting rights to cmnpensation for 
property or materials furnished, or salary for 
services rendered, to the state." 
The Board of Examiners clearly has the duty to 
exercise its constitutional authority and this n1ust be 
considered more than a mere power to exercise or not 
exercise this authority as determined by majority vote 
of the Board. The concept of a constitutional duty to 
examine claims is the holding in the .landmark case of 
Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, supra, and is also the basis 
of the holding in State ex rel. Davis v. Edwards, 33 Utah 
243, 93 Pac. 720 (1908). 
This is consistent with general constitutional and 
statutory rules of interpretation. Powers conferred on 
public officers are generally construed as mandatory 
even where the authority is couched in permissive lan-
guage. In Supervisors of Rock Island County v. United 
States, 4 Wall. 435, 18 L.Ed. 419, the court held that 
a statute providing that county officials "may, if deemed 
advisable" levy a special tax to pay certain debts, was 
mandatory and not permissive. 
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"Tiw conclusion to hP deduced from the au-
thorities is that wht·r.- power is given to public 
officers, in the language of the act before us, 
or in equivalent language, - whenever the public 
inten•st or individual rights call for its exercise, 
- the language used, though permissive in fonn, 
is in fact peren1ptory. vVhat they are empowered 
to do for a third person the law requires shall be 
done. The power is given not for their benefit, 
but for his. It is placed with the depository to 
Ineet the demands of right, and to prevent a fail-
ure of justice. It is given as a remedy to those 
entitled to invoke its aid, and who would other-
wise be remediless. In all such cases it is held 
that the intent of the legislature, which is the 
test, was not to devolve a mere discretion, but to 
impose 'a positive and absolute duty.' " 
Siinilarly, in Palmcroft Development Company v. 
Oity of Phoenix, -!6 Ariz. 200, 49 P.2d 626, the language 
"authorized and empowered" to pay certain indebted-
ness was held to ilnpose a 1nandatory duty to pay such 
indebtedness. See also 43 Ant. Jur. 76, Public Officers, 
Section 259 and annotation at 103 A.L.R. 812 for cases 
involving constitutional or statutory provisions relating 
to payments of public debts. 
These general principles were enunciated by this 
court in Deseret Savings Bank v. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 
:.!17 Pac.114, where it was stated: 
"vVhen power is given by statute to public 
officers, in permissive language, the language 
used will be regarded as peremptory where the 
public interest or individual rights require that 
it should be." 
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Recognition that this principle applies to Article 
YII, Section 13, Utah Constitution, is evidenced by the 
statement in Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, 297 Pac. at 438, 
that the Legislature may not, within the lilnits of the 
Constitution, "exclude the Board of Exmniners from its 
duty and responsibility with respect to claims." Al~o 
note that while the section grants the Board of Exami-
ners "power" to exmnine clailns, it requires the Board 
to "perform such other duties as may be prescribed by 
law." Certainly our Utah Constitution would be a mean-
ingless docu1nent if the powers granted to public offi-
cers we1·e construed as permissive - governn1ent by 
'vhim, not by law. 
POINT II. 
CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 63, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953, IS UNCONSTITUTION-
A'L INSOFAR AS IT AUTHORIZED PAY-
MENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE 
WITHOUT THE EXAMINATION AND AP-
PROVAL OF THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS. 
Turning now to the statute involved, it is apparent 
that the Legislature intended to deprive the Board of 
Examiners of any statutory authority to examine liqui-
dated claims against the State. See the statements in 
63-2-1 and the amend1nents to Chapter 6 of Title 63, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, effected by one of the com-
panion bills to Senate Bill 48 - Chapter 150, Laws of 
Utah 1963. To this we do not and of course could not 
object, but the essential authority of the Board of Exam-
iners is dependent upon the Constitution itself which 
has been held to be a self-executing provision granting 
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authority independent of any statutes. C iutah State 
Bank l' •. Jja.r, ~mpra. This was 1uade particularly clear 
in State ex rel. Davis v . .f.:dward.s, supra, in which this 
court stated "The attmnpt by the Legislature to require 
the Auditor to allow a clahn which by the Constitution 
must first be approved by the Board of Examiners can 
avail nothing. The Auditor is bound by the constitu-
tional provision, the Legislature is so bound and so 
are we.'' 
Section 63-2-13 authorizes the Director of Finance 
to prescribe salaries and the Legislature has purported 
to prohibit the Board of Examiners fr01n fixing, reset-
ting or "arbitrarily'' refusing to pay salaries so fixed. 
'Vhile we do not contend that the Constitution specifi-
cally permits the Board of Examiners to adopt salary 
schedules, it certainly has constitutional authority to 
disapprove a salary claim and refuse to permit payment 
of the smne even though the salary has been fixed by 
the Director of Finance or, for that 1natter, any other 
State officer or agency. Bateman v. Board of Exanti-
ners, supra. A salary not fixed by the Legislature is a 
claim against the State (State ex rel. Davis v. Edwards, 
supra) and regardless of how the amount of the salary 
is arrived at and the method of determining how much 
should be included in the salary claim, the Board of 
Examiners has the authority under the Constitution to 
exercise its constitutional authority with respect to that 
particular claim. 
Respondent agrees with the Legislature that the 
Board of Examiners has no right to act arbitrarily, but 
we fail to see how the Legislature can prohibit the fixing 
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or resetting of a salary based on a Director of Finance 
approved salary schedule and thus prevent the Board 
of Exmniners frmn acting effectively at all. Such a 
result would make 1neaningless and perfunctory any 
exmnination of a salary claim by the Board of Exami-
ners. Paraphrasing the Edu·ards case, the Director of 
Finance is bound b:· the constitutional provision, the 
Legislature is so bound and so is this court. 
In Section 63-2-15, si1nilar authority in another field, 
travel expense, is granted to the Director of Finance and 
for similar reasons the constitutional authority of the 
Board of Examiners is interfered with. Note particu-
la.rly that according to this section it is the Director 
of Finance rather than the Board of Examiners who 
has authority to review "the necessity and desirability 
of such travel." Furthermore, by stating that the trav<'l 
expense schedules shall have "the force of law" and 
that "no voucher for travel expenses shall be paid until 
the san1e have been approved by the director," the Legis-
lature is apparent!:· atten1pting to cmnplett•ly by-pass 
any review by the Board of Examiners. \Vhile the 
statute does not refer to the Board of Exan1iners spe-
cifically, under the literal language a travel expense 
claim, even if examined and approved by the Board of 
Examiners, could not be paid if the Director of Finance 
disapproved. 
Finally, the Legislature in Section 63-2-20 has taken 
a broad swipe at the authority of the Board of Exami-
ners by purporting to vest authority in the Director 
of Finance to review the necessity and desirability of 
all Pxpenditures of funds and lin1iting the Board of 
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Ji~xaminers to a revimv only after the Director of Fi-
nance has acted. The sweeping authority granted to the 
Director of .B,inance by this :-;pdion is particularly ob-
jt>etionable and elParly unconstitutional, for whether the 
Board of Exmniner's authority is considered a duty 
or Inerely a power, the Legislature has purported to 
limit the authority of the Board of Examiners to exami-
nation of claims "only after the obligation has been 
incurred and an account has been submitted and audited 
hy the state's accounting officer." This is a limitation 
not only as to when the Board can act, but also as to 
what the Board can act upon, for if a requested ex-
penditure should be turned down or reduced by the 
Director of Finance, to that extent the Board of Exam-
iners would be denied any effective examination of that 
clain1. 
In other words, the Legislature may not vest au-
thority in the Director of Finance, the Governor, or 
any other agency to increase, decrease or otherwise alter 
requests for expenditures of public funds so as to limit 
or prevent the examination of such requests by the 
Board of Examiners. 
Appellants' contention that the Legislature can de-
fine the constitutional meaning of the word "claim" is 
most unique. As previously pointed out, this court hr.f: 
determined that the constitutional provision is self-
executing and that the term "claim" means all demands 
for payment of state funds. To permit the Legislature 
to say that there is no claim until after the Director of 
Finance has reviewed the necessity and desirability of 
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the expenditure and approved the smne, is not only 
contrary to these prior decisions, but in conflict with 
the fundamental principle that a constitutional provi-
sion may not be modified or mnended by the Legis-
lature. The term "claim" as used in the Constitution 
is broad and unli1nited with the single exception of 
salaries or cmnpensation fixed by law. The fact that 
this one exception and no others are 1nade, is indicatiY<' 
of the broad scope of the tenn and also the fact that 
no other exception pertaining to the Director of Finance 
or any other administrative agency was intended. 
The authority purportedly granted to the Director 
of Finance is more than "preliminary administrative 
handling." (Appellants' Brief, p. 18) If the function of 
the Director of Finance was lilnited to a determination 
that funds were available and that the claim is mathe-
matically correct, Respondent would have no objection 
to a preliminary processing of the clain1 by the Director 
of Finance and agree that such handling is necessary 
and desirable. This was the procedure followed prior 
to the effective date of Senate Bill 48. (Stipulation of 
Facts, para. H (-±) (c) ; R. p. 1-1) Since that time the 
Director of Finance has done more and approved or 
rejected proposed expenditures as to their propriety, 
a function the Constitution vests solely in the Board of 
Examiners. Furthern1ore, as is evidenced by the pay-
ment of the salary clain1 of defendant Clair L. Hopkins, 
the Department of Finance apparently ha:s little com-
punction in paying out state funds even though the 
Board of Examiners has 1nade no exmnination of the 
clain1. 
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POI~T Ill. 
THE BOARD OJ1, EX~\:\1 I XEH~ C~\XKOT 
Dl1~LJ1~U AT~J rTs CONSTITUTIONAL DrTY 
TO I~~XA~II~~J CLAI~IS. 
The lower court determined that the Board of 
t~~xalllinPrs cannot delegate its constitutional duty to ex-
aminP daims. This is of eonePrn to plaintiff and an 
issue in this case because it is apparent that if unlimited 
delegation is possible a majority of the Board of Exami-
ners could at any time delegate all of its authority to 
the Director of Finance or any other person or agency, 
leaving the Board of Exmniners, as a board, without 
any functions. 
Appellants apparently concede that a delegation of 
authority by the Board of Exmniners is permissible and 
must be based upon adequate standards. Respondent 
agrePs. 
\Ye call the court's attention to Exhibits "B" (R. 
19-20), "C" (R. :21-22) and "D" (R. 23-24). These ex-
hibits indicate the delegation of authority 1nade to the 
Deparhnent of Finance in 1941 and thereafter following 
the creation of the Deparhnent of Finance by Chapter 
10, Laws of rtah 1941 (1st Special Session). For fur-
ther background, see the opinions of the Attorney Gen-
eral of rtah dated August 6, 1941 and August :20, 1941. 
(Biennial Report of Attorney General for Biennium 
ending June 30, 1942, pages 83 and 133, respectively). 
Such delegation was not only workable, but a close 
examination indicates that it should be considered lawful 
and valid in all respects for at all times the Board of 
Exa1niners retained (and from time to time exercised) 
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the ultin1ate authority to exanune and approve or dis-
approve clain1s of all types and, furthennore, required 
the Department of Finance in its processing of claims 
to notify the Board of Examiners of any major changes 
in the expenditure policy of a particular department or 
agency of the state. A delegation of this sort permits 
the processing of routine claims without requiring mem-
bers of the Board of Exan1iners to n1ake a detailed 
study of each and every claim. 
There would be nothing improper in the Board of 
Examiners detennining that claims under a certain 
dollar arnount could be approved and paid by the De-
partment of Finance without a detailed review by the 
Board of Exarniners. vVith respect to salaries, salary 
schedules fonnulated by the Director of Finance and 
approved by the Board of Examiners could be estab-
lished as an indication that the salary clain1s conform-
ing to these schedules would be approved by the Board 
of Exan1iners thereafter and could be paid by the De-
partment of Finance without detailed review of each 
salary claim by the Board of Examiners. 
In exercising these functions, it appears necessary 
that the Board of Exarniners rneet regularly or at least 
frequently to make such exarnination of individual clairns 
as rnay be determined necessary and to fonnulate policy 
and the standards by which clain1s could be approved 
without detailed examination. This does not rnean, as 
Appellant contends, that the Board of Exarniners n1ust 
necessarily rneet to approve each IB.J[ "run" of war-
rants to be paid for if it chooses to delegate authority 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
to the DPparhnent of :B,inance it ought to be able to 
n·ly on thP Duparhnent to ad propPrly within the dele-
.~att·d authority. TIH· pnwtie(~ of the individual rnern-
tU'r~ of thP Board signing their nmnes to a :-;umuwry 
Hhe..t li:-;ting the~P warrants could still be followed, if 
d('Hi rahlP, as (•vid('JH'P of the Board's approval of a spe-
<·ifie elaim, but this should not be considered a substi-
t utP for llH'('tings of the Board at which a quorurn is 
prt>~·a·nt where through tlw interchange of ideas intelli-
g-,·nt poliey to govern state expenditures can be fornlu-
lated. 
In other words, so long as the ultimate authority is 
retained by the Board of Examiners and standards are 
~t't up for the adrninistrative agency to process routine 
elaims, there is no interference with the constitutional 
<lutiP~ of the Board of Examiners. However, if the 
Board of Exmniners by majority vote or through mere 
inaction permits all claims to be processed and paid 
by the Departrnent of Finance, the delegation has be-
come an abdication of the responsibility vested by the 
Constitution in the Board of Exan1iners. The lower 
court n1ade this distinction by stating in its opinion 
(R. 33-34) that the Board of Examiners "cannot dele-
~.!;ate its ultirnate duty to detennine the validity of clain1s 
to the GovPrnor or to anybody else, but it may use agents 
in deterrnining the existence or non-existence of certain 
facts and rnay by its rules determine that certain matters 
may be approved as matters of course." This determi-
nation ~hould be affirrned. 
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~-,or the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
H. R. \VALDO, JR. 
Special Asst. Attorney General 
JAMES B. LEE 
Assistant Attorney General 
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